IPPK: an economy-oriented policy
Following the collapse of Soeharto's regime, Indonesia granted district governments more control over managing natural resources, and significantly increased their share of rents from forestry. National decentralization laws introduced in 1999 gave district heads (Bupatis) the authority to issue logging permits for concessions smaller than 100 ha. The policy applied only to production forests zoned for conversion to other uses, and excluded areas where concessions had already been granted. Despite this limitation, across Indonesia almost all districts with forests took immediate advantage of their new powers. This right has since been cancelled by the Ministry of Forestry 1 and by 2003 almost all districts had stopped issuing local small-scale licenses.
The national objective was to strengthen district economies and increase efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in public sector forest management. The national framework for fiscal decentralization 2 says regional income sources should include regionally generated revenues (PAD), nationally shared income, regional loans and "other incomes considered valid and legal" 3 .
According to national law, districts had to introduce their own regulations, or "Perda" governing small-scale concession management. Local Bupatis can also issue decrees governing small concessions. These are lesser regulations that do not have to be debated and passed by the District House of Representatives (DPRD).
The Bupati of Indonesia's Bulungan district acted quickly on the 1999 ministerial decree authorizing local governments to issue small-scale concessions 4 . On 28 June 2000, the Bupati issued a "Granting Licence for Utilising Forest Products" decree 5 covering areas outside the official state-owned forest estate. These are classified as private, community and customary (adat) forests.
Bulungan's Perda No. 17, on Retributions Derived from Granting Licenses for Utilizing Forest Products in private and community forests followed on 2 November 2000 6 . This Perda sets out the district's policy on collecting payments from small-scale concession permits -known locally as IPPK 100 ha permits.
In addition to increasing the opportunities for local communities to benefit from forest resources, Bulungan's policy was aimed at increasing the district's locally-generated revenue (PAD). The Bupati's decree covers issues such as site selection, environmental and social impacts, whereas higher, district regulations (Perda) govern revenue collection. This indicates the priority placed on economic considerations, as only the regulation for collecting revenue was presented to the District House of Representatives (DPRD) for approval. It meant local people only had an opportunity to comment on economic considerations -not social and environmental issues. For a short while, the district government was also able to boost regionally generated forestry revenue (PAD) Small scale 100 ha logging concessions' contribution to regional finance: Case study in Bulungan district Local communities welcomed this national decentralization policy. Bulungan communities entered into partnerships with investors and forest concessionaires, who then applied for permits on their behalf, as the communities lack the capital and capacity to apply for and manage a concession on their own. Demand for IPPK 100 ha permits was high, due to a number of factors: the application process was simple, quick and easy; only a small amount of capital was required in return for quick cash turnovers and supplies of legal timber; and local markets for logs opened up rapidly after the introduction of the policy. Of the DR, the central administration should return 40% to East Kalimantan Province, as the producing region, which will then share portion of the funds to Bulungan. The remaining 60% is distributed to non-producing and timber producing districts.
The total IPPK policy's contribution (from districtgenerated and shared revenues) was only 2.5% of the total regional income (Rp. 95.5 billion) in 2000. Its contribution in 2001, when the district imposed tariffs on log exports for seven months, increased to 3.9% of the total budget (Rp. 413 billion). The proportion of regional budget contributed from IPPK decreased sharply to 0.26% of the total budget (Rp. 587 billion) in 2002.
The IPPK policy significantly contributed to districtgenerated revenue. In 1999, the total districtgenerated revenue was less than Rp. 2 billion. In 2000, this went up to Rp. 4.7 billion, and IPPK revenues contributed almost 50% (Rp. 2.3 billion) of this total annual budget. Income from IPPK timber concession contributions and log tax alone increased sharply in 2001 to Rp. 8.7 billion, this time contributing 39.7% of the district generated budget (PAD) (Rp. 21.9 billion). If the revenue of Rp. 7.6 billion received from log export is included 11 , the total contribution of the IPPK in 2001 constituted 74% of the PAD.
In addition to district generated budgets (PAD), the IPPK policy also contributed significantly to regional income from shared revenues. These were levied on IPPK concession holders and the central government then transferred a proportion back to the districts. 
Facts Behind the Recorded and Actual Receipts Due
We calculated that higher district revenue was due from small-scale logging concessions than the amounts officially documented in the district revenue office (Dispenda) ( One possible reason for the discrepancy was poor coordination between the processes for collecting district level taxes and the process for authorizing timber transportation. Based on the prevailing 13 national regulations, permit holders can only market and transport logs once they have received a letter from a licensing officer in the forestry office,
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Small scale logging concessions' D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n B r i e f The process for collecting district Log tax was not effective. The province issues an SKSHH to concessionaires once they have paid national taxes. This left the district revenue office (Dispenda) with no mechanism to ensure local taxes were paid. District regulation No. 17/2000 14 did stipulate administrative and even criminal sanctions for non-payment. In law, permit holders who did not pay District Log Tax on time should have been charged 2% interest on the tax due for every month of delay. Those who ignored their tax obligations faced at least 6 months in prison or a fine four times the value of the unpaid tax. In practice the sanctions were never applied.
This unclear process for collecting taxes could be part of the reason that there was a difference between the income due to the district and the actual income received and officially recorded. As there were no effective means for enforcing district tax payment, or improving coordination between the various agencies responsible for regulating tax payments to the district and national accounts. During a workshop organized by Yayasan Pionir, CIFOR and the district government on May 6, 2004, participants agreed that there was very weak coordination between agencies in the provincial and the district Forestry Offices in regulating and controlling forest management and revenues. There was a consensus that coordination was especially weak in relation to the processes for authorizing timber transportation (SKSHH issuance) and tax collection. Examples were given of how the confusing hierarchy and unclear divisions of roles and obligations between different government agencies had caused delays in invoicing, collecting and recording payments from permit holders.
The policy-making process itself was another source of confusion. For example, the Bulungan Bupati issued a decree 15 authorizing IPPK 100 ha permit issuance before the district House of Representatives considered and passed regulations on the process for paying and collecting forestry revenue. In addition, although the Bupati issued a regulation 16 in 2000 establishing the district forestry office, the necessary implementing regulations laying out the office's function, roles and responsibilities were not passed until the Head of District Forestry Offices circulated a letter in January 2003 17 . This lead to confusions and overlaps because the IPPK permits continued to be issued -although there was no legal clarity on which office should regulate payments of forestry levies, monitoring and supervision of forest concessions, production reporting, etc.
Finally, there was also a lack capacity for financial administration at the district level. There were not enough qualified district officers, and the officers that did work on financial administration lacked experience and training.
Delivering accountable, controlled, efficient, effective and transparent financial management in the forestry sector at the district level has been an uneasy challenge in the decentralization era.
The Future
When the central government first tried to revoke district Bupatis' authority to issue 100ha community logging permits in 2000, a long dispute followed. Bulungan's Bupati argued that the IPPK policy was benefiting local communities, and therefore it represented a much better system than the previous HPH permit allocation system. Local stakeholders also argued that Law No. 22 on decentralization gave districts responsibility for natural resource management; and because a Law is a higher regulation than a Ministerial Decree or a national government regulation, districts should have retained the right to issue local permits. Bulungan's IPPK policy was officially terminated February 20, 2004 , under a special decree from the Bupati
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. The termination will have a significant impact on district generated income (PAD).
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Small scale logging concessions' D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n B r i e f Following what they see as attempts to recentralize control over forestry, the Bulungan government will continue to try and identify new revenue sources to finance regional governance and development. The district government has recently begun to consider oil palm plantation permits -mostly located in the logged over IPPK concessions -as an option 19 . However, this does not look promising. Of the nine licenses issued since the start of 2004, the Bupati revoked five because the company failed to fulfil administrative requirements and to start initial operations such as land clearing and planting 20 . In addition to this, our GIS analysis demonstrated that 69.7% of the district is actually unsuitable for oil palm plantation, and of the remaining land, only 21.7% is suitable for large-scale oil plantation.
IPPK permits were initially allocated on the basis that the concession areas would be replanted. Interviews with high level officials indicated that the government is also considering how it could generate income (PAD) from centrally-issued HPH concessions covering an area of 784,745 ha -almost half the total area of this district. The key question now is: to what extent will these new efforts take into account the impacts on sustaining resources for the future and maximizing revenue generation and employment from forest land in Bulungan?
One of the most important and relevant lessons is that policy and implementation failures limited the district policy's potential contribution to district generated finance (PAD). The failures arose from unclear central directives on financial management; contradictions and unclear hierarchies between district and provincial policies and functions; and inadequate mechanisms for controlling and monitoring tax payment and collection. Although the policy included administrative and criminal sanctions for delayed or non-payment of forest rents, these were never imposed. These weaknesses limited accountability and transparency, and created possible opportunities for misuse of forest rents.
Another lesson learned is that stronger provisions have to be built into the central, provincial and district's combined policy formulation and implementation to provide socio-economic benefits for local communities and sustain valuable environmental services provided by forests. For example, restoring the environment through reforestation and land rehabilitation relies on centrally transferred reforestation funds (DAK-DR) amounting to hundreds of billions of rupiah. However, the Ministry of Forestry has set rigid and inflexible rules governing how DAK-DR revenues should be used. As a result, reforestation activities have not been successful. Nor is there any provision in the guidelines enabling district governments to invest funds to support local forestdependent communities to build the necessary technical and negotiation skills to sustain their resources and develop their socio-economic wellbeing 21 .
Thus, it will be wiser in the future to carefully consider social, economic and environmental aspects in when formulating forest policies for financial management, because they have much broader impacts at the local level than simply increasing revenue.
Conclusions
1. The IPKK policy was economically oriented to increase regional income. Its contribution in this regard was significant, but it still represented a very small proportion of the entire district budget. The district budget still depends very heavily on the allocation of shared revenues from the centre. This limits local development opportunities. 2. The IPPK policy should have contributed much more to the district budget. Unclear tax collections mechanisms and weak enforcement of sanctions limited the district's revenue from this source.
Recommendations 1. A one-stop payment system on all future permits (timber production and plantation). This would encourage permits holders to pay and make their payments on time; and reduce timber smugglingif the system was tied to the process for authorizing timber transport. 
